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COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT

to the agency by Congress.7 The statutory foundation of Circular 230 is 31 U.S.C. section 330. The first
portion of the statute has been of principal significance in the litigation to date. It allows Treasury to
"regulate the practice of representatives of persons
before" Treasury and to require, as a condition
"before admitting a representative to practice," that
the representative demonstrate "(A) good character;
(B) good reputation; (C) necessary qualifications to
enable the representative to provide persons valuable service; and (D) competence to advise and
assist persons in presenting their cases."8
The original version of what is now 31 U.S.C.
section 330 was enacted in 1884.9 The need for the
1884 legislation arose from the Civil War and westward expansion, which engendered "claims for
damages, pensions, bonuses, back pay, etc .... [A]
swarm of individuals, recognizing no ethical restraints, solicited representation of claimants and
engaged in the buying and selli.ng of the claimants'
rights. [This] reached the proportions of a national
scandal," necessitating granting authority to departments to regulate the representation. 10
31 U.S.C. section 330(a) largely took its current
form in 1982. Wording changes made in 1982 were
stylistic; Congress intended to make no substantive
change in the provision. 11 The statute also consists
of subsection (b) (setting out the sanctions Treasury
may impose for violation of the prescribed rules),
subsection (c) (providing rules particular to ethical
violations by appraisers permitted to practice before the IRS), and subsection (d) (addressing written
advice rendered on potentially abusive transactions). Subsection (d) is discussed in Section V.B.2
below.

II. Loving

Although 31 U.S.C. section 330(a) has changed
little since its enactment in 1884, relevant IRS policies and the importance of return preparers have
both changed. 12 Then, the federal income tax, estate
tax, and gift tax had not yet been enacted, so return
preparers did not exist as tesserae in the mosaic of
American society. Now, "paid return preparers file
about 90 million individual income tax returns each
year, or 60 percent of all individual [income tax]

7

5Pt>, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1869 (2013);
and Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986) ("an agency's power
is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress").
8
31 U.S.C. section 330(a)(1) and (2).
9
Act of Ju ly 7, 1884, ch. 334.
10
George Maurice Morris, "Growth and Regulation of the
Treasury Bar," 8 ABA J. 742 (1922).
11
H.R. Rep. No. 97-651, at 19 (1982); see also Poole v. United
States, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15351, at •5 (D.D.C. 1984).
12
See Gibbs, st1pra note 6, at 336, n.39.
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returns filed."13 The IRS believes that as a result of
incompetence and fraud, returns prepared by uneruolled preparers are especially likely to be materially incorrect. ' 4
In 2011 Treasury promulgated regulations to impose various obligations on previously largely unregulated tax return preparers, including testing
and continuing education requirements.15 The Loving plaintiffs were among these newly regulated
xeturn preparers. They brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 16 and the Declaratory Judgment Act,17 seeking invalidation of
the testing and continuing education requirements
and related fees.18 The district and circuit courts
held for the plaintiffs. They concluded that the
regulations were beyond the scope of the authority
conferred on Treasury by 31 U.S.C. section 330(a)
and thus were invalid under Chevron step one. 19
The circuit court set forth six rationales, of which
two are principally significant for our discussion. 20
First, the circuit court concluded that tax return

13
Preston Benoit, deputy director of the IRS Return Preparer
Office, quoted by Matthew R. Madara, "rRS Officials Request
Authority to Regulate Preparers," Tax Notes, Aug. 25, 2014, p.
921 (adding that paid tax return preparers have a "significant
im~act on tax administration").
4
See, e.g., Allison Bennett, "]RS Study Finds High ElTC
Overclaims by Unenrolled Tax Return Preparers," 33 Tax Man.
Weekly Rep. 1184 (2014) (reporting that earned income tax credits
were overclaimed in 33 to 40 percent of returns prepared by
unenrolled preparers, compared with 11 to 13 percent of returns
prepared by vol unteers in IRS-sponsored programs; adding,
however, "it wou ld take further research to determine whether
these dollar overclaim percentages were due to the behavior
and ability of preparers, or differences in the characteristics of
tax~ayers seeking assistance").
5
31 C.F.R. sections 10.3(f), 10.4(d), 10.5, 10.6(d)(2), 10.6(e)(2),
and 10.6(f).
16
5 U.S.C. section 706(2).
17
28 U.S.C. sections 2201 and 2202.
18
The plaintiffs did not ch allenge, and the court did not
invalidate, the rei,rulations' requirement that preparers obtain
preparer tax identification numbers. Lovi11g, 920 F. Supp.2d 108,
109 (D.D.C. 2013).
19
£.g., Loving, 742 F.3d at 1022 ("Put in conventiona l Chevron
parlance, the lRS's interpretation fails at Chevron step 1 because
it is foreclosed by the statute. Tn any event, the fRS's interpretation would also fail at Chevron step 2 because it is unreasonable in light of the statute's text, history, s tru cture, and
context.''); see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
2
°The other four, partly interrelated rationales were: "the
history of section 330" (it did not originally target tax return
preparers), " the broader statutory framework" (the many targeted provisions in the code, which would have been unnecessary if 31 U.S.C. section 330 is as expansive as claimed by the
IRS), "the nature and scope of the authority being claimed by
the IRS" (inadequate legislative s upport for "vast expansion of
the IRS's authority"), and "the IRS's past approach to this
statute" (the uneasy relationship of the IRS's current position to
its century and a half of inactivity under the statute). Loving, 742
F.3d at 1019-1021 .
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challenged provisions based again on Chevron step
one analysis. The cour t followed the Loving approach, including the representatives and practice
rationales: The preparer merely assists the taxpaye r
and lacks the legal authority to act on the taxpayer's
behalf, so he is not a representative;"1 and there is
no extant controversy before commencement of the
lRS audit or administrative appeal, so assisting on
the claims does not involve practice before the
IRS.32
The Ridgely court rejected the government's
counterarguments. For instance, the government
argued that in addition to authority granted by the
statute, agencies have inherent authority to regulate
practice before them. The Ridgely court, as had the
court in Loving, rejected this on the ground that a
sp ecific statutory delegation displaces any inherent
authority.33
The government also argued that preparers
sometimes engage in activities apart from making
ordinary refund claims - services properly s ubject
to Treasury regulation even under the Loving conception, bringing them within the ambit of Circular
230. This view appears to reflect government policy
rather than an ad hoc litigation position. The director of the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility
has been quoted as saying, "After a practitioner
s ubmits a Form 2848 'Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative,' granting them [sic]
power of attorney, [OPR] will treat the practitioner
as covered by Circular 230."34 Nonetheless, the
Ridgely court gave short shrift to this "within Circular 230 in any respect means within Circular 230
in all respects" contention. 35

B. Other Cases
1. Forerunners. Although the Loving opinions
reached the right result, their outcome was striking
for at least two reasons. First, the government had
stressed the practical importance of the invalidated
2011 regulations,36 and it is no light matter for "the
least dangerous branch"37 to invalidate what the
political branches believe to be an initiative of great
public policy significance.38 The Loving courts transcended this reluctance by stressing that in law, the
end does not always justify the means,39 and, .in an
act of rhetorical jujits u, by invoking the interpretational principle that the higher the practical stakes
of the issue, the clearer must be the evidence that
Congress intended to delegate resolution of the
issue to an agency rather than reserving that resolution for itself. 40
The second reason the Loving result is s triking is
more germane for present purposes. Litigation before Lovinf? had given little hint that substantial
aspects of Circular 230 might be at risk of invalidation. For example, the D.C. district court's 1984
Poole decision rejected a challenge to the validity of
Circular 230 section 10.50, which defines disreputable conduct - one of the bases for disbarment or
other sanctions under Circu lar 230 section 10.51.41
The plaintiff was a CPA who had been disbarred
from practicing before the IRS because of his willful
failure to file his own income tax returns for three
consecutive years.
The CPA argued that Treasury's regulatory authority under Circular 230 is limited to those who

36
See
37

Johnson, supra note 5, at 520-524.
See Alexander Hamilton, Tlte Federalist, No. 781 at 4 (Clinton

matter o f law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986).
However, this usua l s tandard is modified when a court
reviews an admi.nis trative d ecisio n unde r the APA. ln an APA
case, the role of the trial court is to ascertain whether "as a
matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did." Thus, summary
judgment in an APA case is used to determine whether, as a
matter of law, "the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard
of review." Sierra Clu/1 v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp.2d 76, 90 (D.D.C.
2006) (citations omitted); see also Richards v. INS, 554 F2d 1173,
1177, and n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
31
Ridgely, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXJS 96447, at •1s.
32
/d. at •16.
1
"- 1d. at •22; see also Loving, 742 F.3d a t 1014-1016. See generally
Johnson, " When General Statutes and Specific Statutes Conflict," State Tax Notes, July 12, 2010, p. 113.
1
3' Karen Hawkins as quoted by Will iam R. Davis, "OPR Will
Tell Practitioners to Remove C ircular 230 Disclaimers," Tax
Note.s, June 23, 2014, p. 1360.
35
See Ridgely, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96447, at •22.
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Rossiter, ed. 1961).
38As was illustrated by the gymnastics Chief Justice John G.
Roberts Jr. performed to avoid invalidating the A{fordable Care
Act. See National Federat ion of Independent Business v. Sebelius
(NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593-2600 (2012) (concluding that the
shared responsibility payment js no t a tax for sta tutory purposes but is a tax for constitutional purposes).
:wLoving, 742 F.3d at 1022. Quoting two tax cases, the
Supreme Court recently observed: "But in the last analysis,
these a lways-fascinating policy discussions are beside the point.
The role of this Court is to apply the s tatute as it is w ri tten even if we think some other approach might accor[dj with good
policy." Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2014)
(punctuation omitted) (q uoting Commissioner v. Lundy, 516 U.S.
235, 252 (1996), quoting Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386,
398 (1984)).
40
Loving, 742 F.3d at 1021 ("co urts should not lightly presume
congressional intent to implicitly delegate decisions of major
economic or political s ignificance to agencies"); see also Utility
Air Regulatory Group v. E.PA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014), and
FDA v. Brown & Willia111so11 Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160
(2000).
41
Poole, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15351.
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represent claimants before Treasury. The court disagreed, finding that the agency's "disciplinary authority clearly extends to all practitioners before the
Treasury Department."42 The Poole court, however,
did not attempt to definitively resolve the questions, key to Loving and Ridgely, of precisely what
constitutes practice and who are representatives for
purposes of 31 U.S.C. section 330(a).
The spirit of Poole seemed congenial to generous
construction of 31 U.S.C. section 330(a),43 but there
is nothing definitive in the case for our issues, and
there are several distinguishing features. 44 Poole was
not cited in any of the Loving or Ridgely opinions.45
For the above reasons, this omission is readily
w1derstandable.
Another pre-Loving case is Wright v. Everson,
decided in 2008.46 Under section 10.7(c)(l) of Circular 230, unenrolled tax return preparers may represent taxpayers before the IRS in only limited
circumstances. The plaintiff, an unenroJled preparer, challenged this restriction. The court found
that there were valid reasons for distinguishing
among types of advisers and thus that Circular 230
section 10.7(c)(l) was not arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. In Wright, the
plaintiff sought to expand the scope of regulated
representation, not to contract it as in Loving. Accordingly, Wright, too, is of limited utility in this
context.
Some recent cases have mentioned Loving in not
especially helpful contexts.47 In other cases, parties
have distorted Loving in futile efforts to deflect tax
enforcement directed against them. 4 8 More interest-

ing are cases involving challenges to fees charged to
practitioners by the IRS. Return preparers are
charged user fees by the IRS for obtaining and
renewing preparer tax identification numbers. ln
the 2012 case of Brannen v. United States, the Elcvenfh Circuit rejected a constitutional challenge to
fees for initially obtaining PTINs. 49 The following
year, a district court in the Eleventh Circuit rejected
a statutory challenge and held that the renewal fees
are not arbitrary and capricious in either design or
amount. 511
Although the plaintiff in that case, Buckley v.
United States, urged the court to look to Loving for
guidance, the court was not moved. PTINs are
required by statutes other than 31 U.S.C. section
330.s 1 Similarly, although user fees are mentioned in
Circular 230,52 there is statutory authorization for
them outside 31 U.S.C. section 330.53 Because the
PTIN scheme and the testing/ continuing education
scheme rested on different statutory authority, the
Bucklet; court found that Loving had no applicability
to the case.54 Litigation on this score continues.
Section III.C.2 describes a pending suit regarding
PTIN fees.
2. AICPA . Section IV explores how the government
may react to Loving, Ridgely, and possible future
decisions of similar ilk. One approach is to substitute the carrot for the stick - that is, to attempt to
achieve the same ends through voluntary rather
than mandatory means. Arguably, that is how the
IRS has responded to Loving.
Although, as described in Section IV, the government is urging Congress to legislatively reverse
Loving, the IRS created an ostensibly voluntary

42 1d.

at •2.
"fhe Poole court remarked that courts "must uphold the
agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute it administers"
and even invoked the inherent authority notion rejected by
Loving. Id. at *5.
44
0ver a half century of consistent judicial and administrative interpretation supported the government's position in
Poole. Id. ln contrast, the regulations at issue in Loving were
promulgated in 2011, over a century and a half after original
enactment of the statutory authori ty. Moreover, before 2011, IRS
officials sometimes publicly denied that they had the authority
under the statute to enact rules such as those in the 20ll
regulations. See Loving, 742 F.3d at 1021.
15
' Lndeed, Poole has been cited in only one judicial decision a tort case, Sicig11ano v. United Stales, 127 F. Supp.2d 325, 331 (D.
Conn. 2001).
46
543 F.3d 649 (11th Cir. 2008).
47
E.g., Marlin v. /TH Tax Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15512, at
*24, n.6 (D.S.C. Feb. 5, 2013) (noting the possible relevance of
Loving to subsidiary questions on class certification in a tort
4

case~.

4
E.g., United States v. Elsass, 978 F. Supp.2d 901, 911-912 (S.D.
Ohio 2013) {rejecting the defendants' attempt to use Loving to
wriggle out of a permanent injunction against their egregious
misbehavior as return preparers); and United States v. 1'0111/inson,
No. 12-10051 -01 (D. Kan. 2013) (mentioning Loving in rejecting

the argument of the defendant in a criminal tax case that only
those subject to regulation under Circular 230 can be subject to
criminal prosecution under section 7206(2) for aiding and
assisting in preparing and filing fa lse and fraudulent returns).
49
Brannen v. United States, 682 F.3d 13J6 (11th Cir. 2012), affg
No. 4:11-CV-0135 (N.D. Ga. 2011).
50 8uckley v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184758 (N.D.
Ca. 2013).
51
" Any return or claim for refund prepared by a tax return
preparer shall bear such identifying number" as Treasury will
prescribe. Section 6109(a)(4); see section 6695(c) (penalty for
failure to comply with section 6109(a)(4)), section 6696(e) (defining return and claim for refund), and section 770l(a)(36)
(with stated exceptions, defining a tax return preparer as "any
person who prepares for compensation ... any return . . . or
claim for rehmd" or who so prepares "a substantia l portion of a
return or claim for refund").
52
See 31 C.F.R. section l0.6(d)(6).
s.'See 31 C.F.R. section 9701 {authorizing agencies to charge
user fees and setting out criteria for determining their amount).
54 Bucklet;, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184758, at *7; see also Loving,
920 F. Supp.2d at 109 (clarifying that the Loving holding does not
extend to the PTIN scheme "except that the IRS may no longer
condition PTIN availability on being 'authorized to practice'
under 31 U.S.C. section 330").

(Footnote continued in next column.)
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annual filing season program (AFSP). While the
AFSP was being developed, both the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the
National Association of Enrolled Agents expressed
to the IRS their doubts about the wisdom and
legality of the initiative.55 Undeterred, the IRS established the AFSP in June 2014.5 6
The AFSP targets return preparers who are not
already enrolled agents57 - the same target population as the regulations invalidated in Loving. Under the AFSP, preparers will receive benefits if they
do voluntarily what the invalidated regulations
would have compelled them to do: pass an IRSdevised examination and satisfy specified continuing education requirements. 58 The benefits from
taking these steps are an IRS-issued record of
completion, inclusion of the preparer in a preparer
database publicly accessible through the IRS's website, and a limited ability to represent taxpayers
before the IRS regarding returns they prepare.s9
On July 15, 2014, the AICPA filed suit in (can you
guess? that's right) the D.C. district court for declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate the
AFSP. The suit alleged that (1) the CRS lacks statutory authority to create such a program; (2) the
AFSP was promulgated in violation of the notice
and comment rules of the APA;60 and (3) the AFSP
is arbitrary and capricious under the APA61 because
it will confuse consumers and will not effectively
address policy issues concerning unethical return
preparers. The AICPA maintained that the AFSP is
an impermissible attempt to make an end run
around Loving: Because it would create strong competitive pressures to comply, the nominally voluntary program is de facto mandatory.62
Concluding that the AlCPA lacked standing, the
district court granted the government's motion to
dismiss the suit. 63 None of the AICPA's members

55
See, e.g., David van den Berg, "EnrC>lled Agents Ask IRS to
Scrap Return Preparer Proposal," Tax Notes, June 2, 2014, p.
1017.
fi<> FS-2014-8; lR-2014-75.
57
Enrolled agents are persons who are not attorneys or CPAs
but who have passed a competence test administered by or for
the IRS. Enrolled agents were subject to Circular 230 even before
promulgation of the 2011 regulations that were invalidated in
Lovinx. Sl'f 31 C.F.R. sections 10.3 through 10.6.
r.ssee A/CPA v. IR S, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXJS 157723, at *6 (D.D.C.
Oct. 27, 2014) ("The criteria for participation [in the AFSPJ are
strikingly similar tC> the requirements of the 2011 Rule").
59
See Rev. Proc. 2014-42, 2014-29 !RB 192.
60
5 U.S.C. section 553.
1
'' 5 U.S.C. section 706(2)(A).
62
See William Hoffman, "AlCPA Files Suit to Stop IRS
Pre£arer Certification Program," Tax Notes, July 21, 2014, p. 240.
3
Although the district court did not reach the merits, the
government might have won if it had. The same judge decided
Lovi11x and A/CPA. In Loving, the judge had s ugges ted in dictum
(Footnote continued in next column.)
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are uneruolled return preparers. The AICPA contended that although the AFSP does not hurt the
organization, it does hurt its members, which thus
allows the AICPA to sue under the doctrine of
representational or associational standing. This contention failed because the court found the members'
alleged injury in fact to be conclusory, speculative,
and not fairly traceable to the AFSP.64
That may not be the end of the story. The AICPA
may appeal. If it doesn't, it (or another organization) likely could find someone who does have
sufficient connection and who would be willing to
join as a plaintiff in a new suit. Since the same wine
may be poured out of different bottles in future
litigation, I analyze below the merits of the AICPA's
contentions.
The AICPA's suit implicated a significant but
somewhat murky vein of administrative law. Generally, the APA requires agencies to publish proposed rules in the Federal Register, to give interested
persons the opportunity to comment on the proposed rules, and to consider comments seriously in
promulgating final rules. Agency "interpretative
rules, general statements of policy, [and] rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice" are
excepted from these requirements.65
Courts have wrestled with the contours of this
exception, but generally speaking, rules that create
binding obligations are outside it.66 Nonetheless,
scholars and courts have recognized the reality that
even formally nonbinding agency pronouncements
can, as a practical matter, have powerful, sometimes
coercive, effects on regulated persons.67
No bright-line rule exists. On one hand, "Congress did not intend that the APA definition of a rule
be construed so broadly that every agency action
would be subject to judicial review. "68 On the other
hand, at some point, an agency's nominally voluntary program can be a binding rule. 69 In making this

that the IRS try a voluntary program, a fact the judge noted in

A/CPA . See A/CPA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157723, at "2; and
Loving, 920 F. Supp.2d at 111.
61
AICPA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157723, at •18-*20.
C>S5 U.S.C. sectiC>n 553(b)(3)(A).
e.g., Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 315 (1979); Ameriam
Mining Corp. & Nat'/ Ind. Sand Ass'n v. Mine Safety & Healtlt
Admin.1 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
67
£.g., Mark Seidenfeld, "Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents," 90 Tex. L. Rev. 331, 343
(2011); cf NrTB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602, and Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937) (both recognizing that at some
point, pressure can become so intense that it turns into compulsion).
68
/ndustrial Safety Equip. Ass'n Inc. v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1120
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
69
E.g., Sugar Cane Growers Co-op of Florida v. Veneman, 289 F.3d
89, 96 and n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
66 See,
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substance-over-form evaluation, courts have adverted, wiUl varying degrees of favor, to factors
such as wheth<>r the allt>ged compulsion is direct or
indirect, how substantial Lhc impact is on the regulated person o r group, and whether the agency
acted with an improper purpoS<.' or from an erroneous factual foundtllion .711
Of particular inlcrt• ' t in the A/CPA context, the
substance-over-form <ln<ilysis C<ln include (although
not necessarily as dt.'Cisivc considcralions) whether
the agency "put.<> a s tamp of approvaJ or disapprovaJ on a given type of bc.•havior"71 and whether
the agency h<ls an "intent of penalizing a party
through adverse publicity."12 Given the circumstances of it~ dcvclopmcnl, these considerations
may be pertinent lo the A FS P.
Given the statc of tht• law, one can hardly assert
with confidcnce a vit'W on whether the AJCPA's "in
substance mandatory" argument wouJd succeed.
My conjecture flt this stage is that it would be hard
for a plaintiff with standing to establish lhat the
AFSP crosses th<• Uucshold into d<' facto mandatory,
but that factual development, advocacy skill, and
judicial inclination a ll would have roles to play in
the determination.
l harbor ~rious doubts about the AJCPA's arbitrary and capriciou~ contention. It is illegitimate for
courts - under U1c guise f>f judicial review - to
substitute their own policy judgments and preferences for those of ag1mcics with specialized expertise on lhe subjc'Cl mattcr. 71 Accordingly, courts
conducting an arbitrary and capricious reviews are
deferential to agencies' balancing of competing
consideralions.74 I doubt that complaints like the

70

£.X·· lmfristrwl Snfl'ly l~q11iJ1. 1 837 F.2d at 1120-1121; and
Americ1111 llos11. A,s·11 v. /louw11, &14 P.2d 1037, 1046-1048 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
11
Amerirnn llos11. Ass'11, H..14 F.2d at 1047.
1'2fnd11stri11/ Snfl•ttt I.quip., 837 fi.2d nt 1119.
7.1£.g., M1ssmtr1 v. /t•11k111s, 515 U.S. 70, 131- 133 (1995)
(ThomaJ>,

J.,

AICPA's r<'garding customer confusion and the
failure to solve a ll problems would suffice to overcome this deference.
Tf the foregoing "fX'Culations prove accurate, the
hope of the plaintiff with standing would hang on
the argument that th<' IRS hr'ld no statutory authority to crc.•atc the AFSP. Th<'lt is, of course, where
Lul.ling and Ridgl'ly come.• in. However, assuming the
court condudt>s that lhc AFSP is indeed voluntary,
there may be a difference between the nonbinding
agency action in l\ICP/\ tlnd th<' binding agency
actions in uming and Ritfgl'ly. ls thC' no-statutorybasis argument JS strong in thC' former context as in
the latter?
[f prior Supreme Court pronouncements are
taken literally, ag~mcy actions of every sort must be
traceable to a congressional conferral of power.75
However, al IN1s l two rejoinders might be available
to the lRS in .rn /\TCP/\-likc su it. First, a generous
construction of one of the s tatutory provisions
might cover th<> AFSr. For instance, Congress has
delegated to Lh<.' Trc•asury secretary the administration and enfo rcemf.'nt of the lntemaJ Revenue
Code7" and hai:: allowed th<' secretary to s ubdeJegate to the IRS commissioner "c;uch duties and
powers as the Secretary may prescribe, including
the power to ... administer, manage, conduct, direct, and c;upervisc the l'xccution of the internal
revenue law<;." 77 A mandatory registration program
might fall oulc;idt' lhc ambit of lhis provision, but a
voluntary incl'ntivc program might fall within it.
Second, perhaps inhcl'C'nt agency authority - a
concept rcjcctt-d in Lovi11g and Ridgely78 but recognized i_n Poo/e7'1 - would cover a voluntary program. Lm1i11g and Hidgcly rejected the government's
"inherent t\gcmcy outhority" argument on the
ground thal 31 U.S.C. section 330, a specific statutory provis ion, controls over general inherent
power. But 31 U.S.C. section 330 Clpplies to regulating reprcscnta livcs appearing before Treasury and
to admitting them lt) pr<lctice.1(11 1f the AFSP is held

concu mn>;); Ciliu11s to flreseTVl' ODl!rton Park v.

Volpe, -IOI U.S. -102, 415-416 ( IY71); f'ltdfJS Dodgt• Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 177, 19-l (19-11); and Richard J. Pierre Jr., "The Role of
Constitutional and Pohtkal 11,corv m Admini!.lrative Law," 64

Tex. L Rro. 46Y, c;(}.l-l\07 ( 19R"i)
7..E.g., rlorula 8"11k1·,.., i\ ..,·11 u. Dq1art111mt of Treasury, 2014
lJ.S. Dht. LE>.IS 352 1, ill • 1-1 (D l>.C. )iln n , 2014) Judge Jame:;.
E. aoa .. ~rg Wn.lll• bl1th th(' I [11rult1 B.111k1•rs and uwmg opinions
for the D.C di .. trict court.
An agency "i" a11thor1/Lod tu maM- a r.llional legislath·tHype
judgment If lhl.' [rult·I ~ll-.:tt.J by tlw agency reflects its
infomwd d1..cretmn, .ind •~ ne1thl'r pall'ntly unreasonable nor a
dictate of unbndll-d whim, lhl'll the agency's decision adequately ~h.,fil'l> lhl· l.irbitrnrv and capricious! standard of
review.'' W/G Trlr11l1t111c• Co t•. fCC, 675 F.2d JM6, 388-389 tD.C.
Cir. 1982) (cit<Jtiuru. .md punctu.-ition marks omitted); see al.."'1
Assocml<•d B11i/1/itrs & CMtrntltlrs f11r t>. <;/ii11, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 371116, ill •47..•48 (0.D.C. Mnr. 21, 2014) (rejecting an
arbitrary and c11pricio11-; ch«llenf<\I.' anti staling, "Plaintiff may
ffootnotr continued in next col umn.)
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well be oom...oct Lhat mor(' targetl>J data and modified calculation::. Wlmld le.id tu <> more prt.ic1se ulllil.llion goal, but perfect
prec1::.ion 1::. not what the Admim::.trative Pmcedure Act demands").
7'ir.g WUNU/Ul flub ~1·rv Cu111111 II t~ rec. 476 U.S. 355, 374
(1986) ("an agency lill•rally ha., no pmvcr to act ... unless and
until c,1ngn.":>l> cunfor.. pmwr upon 1t").
"''Section 7801(il)(I).
I

77

Sechon 7t103{a)(2)(A)

wvm;.:, 742 F.3d ill 1014-1016; Rtdgt>ly, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
96447, at •22. !'t'(' ~1111ro lext <iccomp<inyin); note 24.
Npooft•, 1984 U.S D1'>I Ll.Xl5 15151 , at •.t-•s. Set> supra note
43. 1lowcwr, fl0{1/1• pl'l.'(t'<ft-d /..011is1111111 Public Service, which
emphasized that agl•ncic., have no powers except those conferred nn them by .. tntull!. Sc•1• s111ir11 note 7'i.
78

lll1J1 U.S.C !>t'Clmn .\10(ri)(I), (2).
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to be voluntary, it arguably would be outside the
domain of 31 U.S.C. section 330. Then 31 U.S.C.
section 330 would not displace inherent agency
authority. Even if that were accepted, the government would still have to define the contours of
inherent agency authority and show that the AFSP
is within them. Far from a slam dunk, this nonetheless is a potential government response to the
no-authority argument.
Could that response be buttressed by asserting a
statutory basis for the alleged inherent powers? The
so-called housekeeping statute applies to all federal
agencies, including Treasury. It provides: "The head
of an Executive department ... may prescribe regulations for the government of his department, the
conduct of its employees, and the custody, use, and
preservation of its records, papers, and property."81
The roots of the provision reach back to the founding of the republic.82
In the main, courts have read the statute as being
narrow. The statute "seems to be simply a grant of
authority to [an] agency to regulate its own affairs,"83 and it confers only administrative, not
legislative, power.84 This would not seem to move
the IRS beyond what Loving and Ridgely already
allow. That is, the housekeeping statute might allow
the IRS to impose requirements on practitioners
directly interacting with the IRS but would seem
not to extend to activities preceding an IRS audit or
other agency-taxpayer interactive processes.
However, the outer boundaries of the statute
have never been precisely defined. Perhaps it's the
nature of the beast that only case-by-case decisionmaking is possible. And the courts' generally restrained view of the statute does not stop agencies
from trying to make rules. Agencies in need of
statutory authority have asserted the housekeeping
statute as the basis for many regulatory initiatives.
Creative and aggressive agency assertions of authority under the statute have usually been rejected
by the courts - but not always.ss
Finally, to complicate matters further, there is
another potential strand of analysis. Above, we
considered whether the AFSP is a rule for APA
purposes. But the APA also addresses other types of
agency actions, one of whkh is an agency's impo-

sition of sanctions. The APA provides that a ''sanction may not be imposed ... except within
jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law,"86 and it allows courts to "hold
unlawful and set aside agency action ... in excess
of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations."87
If a return preparer does not voluntarily satisfy
the requirements of the AFSP, the IRS will with.hold
from her a certificate of completion, recognition on
the IRS website, and representation privileges.
Could those consequences be considered sanctions?
The APA defines sanction broadly, to encompass
deprivation of freedom, imposition of a fine, seizure
of property, denial of a license, or "taking other
compulsory or restrictive action."SS Under some
circumstances, adverse publicity can constitute a
sanction.89 The AICPA's complaint did not raise the
AFSP-as-sanction argument, but that issue may
develop later.

3. Pending cases. Two other challenges to Circular
230 provisions have garnered attention.90 The plaintiff in Sexton v. Hawkins 91 is a former lawyer who
was disbarred by his state after he pleaded guilty to
mail fraud and money laundering. He still has a
valid PTIN. OPR has suspended him from practice
before the IRS and is pursuing an ongoing investigation of him. Incident to the investigation, OPR
sought to compel hjm to disclose documents and
answer interrogatories, with the prospect of sanctions under Circular 230 should he fail to comply.
He brought suit, seeking injwKtive relief against
the ongoing investigation. Citing Loving, the plaintiff alleges that he is not a practitioner before the
IRS, that mere possession of a PTIN does not make
him one, and that he is therefore not subject to
regulatory supervision under Circular 230.

The government counters that Loving is not germane. OPR is investigating the plaintiff not merely
as a return preparer but because of allegations that
he offered to give written tax advice despite being
suspended from practice before the IRS. In August
2013 the government filed a motion to dismiss. fr1
October 2014 the court denied that motion. The
case, presumably, will proceed to trial. During the
pendency of the case, the plaintiffs need not produce information requested by the IRS, and the

1

~ 5 U.S.C. section 301.
2

1t was enacted in 1789 "to help General Washington get his
administration underway by speUing out the authority for
executive officials to set up offices and file Government documents." H.R. Rep. No. 85-1461, at 1 (1958).
83
CJ1rysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 309 (1979).
ll4United States v. George, 228 U.S. 14, 22 (1913).
i;

85
Sce United States ex rel. O'Keefe v. McD011nell Douglas Corp.,
132 F.3d 1252, 1254-1256 (8th Cir. 1998) (reviewing cases, includ-

ing a few agency victories).
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U.S.C. section 558(a).
5 U.S.C. section 706(2)(c).
88
5 U.S.C. section 551 (10).
89
Sec, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 602 F.2d 401, 408
(D.C. Cir. 1979); and H. Rep. No. 7-1980 (1946) (House report on
the APA).
90
See Jaime Arora, "2 Cases to Watch in the Wake of Loving,"
Tax Notes, Sept. 1, 2014, p . 1029.
91
No.13-cv-00893 (D. Nev. 2014).
87
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government may not curtail the plaintiffs' ability to
electronically file returns for clients for failure to
produce information.
In Davis v. JRS, 92 the plaintiff had pleaded guilty
to aiding the preparation of a false tax return,
leading to the loss of his CPA license, termination of
his ability to practice before the IRS, and expulsion
from participation in the IRS's e-file system. His
CPA license and ability to practice before the IRS
were later restored. His access to the e-file system
was not, however. Because most retmn preparers
are required to use e-filing, this omission essentially
prevents him from preparing returns, effectively
nullifying his reinstatement.93 In essence, the plaintiff is arguing that preparing returns is practicing
before the IRS. That was the government's rejected
position in Loving.

The plaintiff filed suit, asking the court to direct
the IRS to allow him to again participate in thee-file
system. As of this writing, the case was in the
discovery stage. If the case goes forward, it will be
interesting to see whether and how the government
controverts what had been its position in Loving.
On September 8, 2014, the plaintiffs filed their
complaint in Steele v. United States. As noted in
Section II.B above, suits against PTIN fees failed in
Brannen and Buckley, that is, in the Eleventh Circuit
and one of its district courts. The plaintiffs filed
Steele (unsurprisingly) in the D.C. district court to
capitalize on Loving and Ridgely.
Interestingly, Steele was brought as a class action
on behalf of two named CPAs and, according to the
caption of the complaint, "A Class of More Than
700,000 Similarly Situated Individuals and Businesses."94 The class consists of:
individuals who prepare tax returns for others
for compensation and firms (including partnerships) and companies the employees or
some or all of the owners of which prepare tax
returns for others for compensation, and who:

(a) paid the initial PTIN issuance user fee; or

92

No. 14-cv-0261 (N.D. Ohio 20J4).
'.l:J.The IRS can censure, suspend, disbar, or impose monetary
penalties against any practitioner who inter a/ia. is incompetent
or disreputable. 31 C.F.R. section l0.50(a). Incompetence and
disreputable conduct include "willJully failing to file on magnetic or other electronic media a tax return prepared by the
practitioner when the practitioner is required to do so by the
Federal tax laws unless the fai lure is due to reasonable cause
a.nd not due to willful neglect." 31 C.P.R. section 10.51(a)(16).
94
0r maybe more. Paragraph 106 of the complaint states:
"The number of plaintiffs is believed to be between 700,000 and
1,200,000." Steele v. United St11tes, No. 1:cv-14-1523 (D.D.C. filed
Sept. 8, 2014).
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(b) paid the initial PTIN issuance user fee and
one or more P'TIN renewal user fees. 95
The complaint alleges that both the fee paid to
obtain a PTIN initially and fees paid for annual
renewals of the PTIN are invalid or excessive.
Recognizing that the statutory authority for imposition of user fees is 31 U.S.C. section 9701, the Steele
plaintiffs maintain that the conditions of a valid
user fee are not satisfied. For instance, they allege
that a user fee must be justified by a special benefit
conferred by the government on the fee payer.96 Yet
"no special benefit is provided to a tax return
preparer who obtains or renews a PTIN because, in
accordance with the Loving case and the U.S. Constitution, a tax return preparer has a right to prepare
returns for others for compensation."97 The Steele
plaintiffs also allege that the amounts of the initial
and renewal fees98 are greatly excessive because the
functions that the fees are supposed to support are
impermissible or have not actually been performed
by the IRS.9''
The 14 counts for relief include declaratory judgment that Treasury lacks statutory authority to
charge initial and renewal PTIN fees or, alternatively, declaratory judgment that the fees charged
are excessive; a refW1d of fees already paid, with
interest; and a permanent injunction prohibiting the
charging of future initial or renewal PTIN fees or,
alternatively, a permanent injunction prohibiting
the charging of excessive future initial or renewal
fees.
The Steele plaintiffs must, of course, sail into the
head winds of Brannen and Buckfet;, cases that
upheld PTIN fees.100 Nonetheless, Steele raises substantial questions. The plaintiffs may have a better
chance of prevailing on their alternative argument
(that the fees are excessive in amount) than on their
primary argument (that the fees are wholly invalid).

95 £d. at para. 13. However, the Buckley plaintiffs are expressly
excluded from the purported class. Id.
96
/d. at paras. 90-91 (citing FPC v. New England Power Co., 415
U.S. 345 (1974)).
97
1d. at para. 93.
9
8Tl1e fees are $50 initia lly and another $50 for each annua l
renewal. To each is added $14.25, a cha.rge paid to a third party
to administer the process. T.D. 9501 (Sept. 2010 final regulations).
·
99
Steele complaint, sttpra note 94, at paras. 63-72 and 97-101.
1
00fhe Eleventh Circuit did not find the issue to be close.
Brannen, 682 F.3d at 1319 ("We readily conclude that, under the
plain language of section 6109(a)(4), the PTIN is issued to tax
return preparers for a special benefit. And we readily conclude
that the benefit - the privilege of preparing tax returns for
others for compensation - is the kind of 'special benefit' that
qualifies lmder New England Power. The user fee here clearly
confers a benefit which is not received by the general public.").
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The Eleventh Circuit pointedly observed that what
has become the Steele alternative argument was not
before it in Brannen. 10 1
Moreover, the landscape is different. The Eleventh Circuit handed down Brannen before Loving
was decided. Loving, but not Ridgely, had been
decided before Buckley, but the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia did not discuss
Loving at length. It may be in Steele that the D.C.
district court - the court that decided both Loving
and Ridgely - will find those decisions of greater
relevance than the Buckley court did.
IV. Possible Threats to Circular 230
A. Evolutio n of Circular 230
In an excellent concise history, Bryan T. Camp
d1aracterized the history of the Treasury ethical
rules as "one of ever-expanding regulation."102 The
tax shelter wars have been an important driver of
this expansion in recent decades. Treasury ethical
rules increasingly were enlisted to combat shelters
and other allegedly abusive arrangements.'°3
In its current iteration, Circular 230 has five
subparts. Subpart A consists of nine sections setting
out rules governing the authority to practice before
the IRS. For our purposes, the key provisions involve section 10.3 regarding what kinds of persons
may practice before the IRS and what they may do,
plus related definitions in section 10.2.
Reflecting the expansion of Circular 230, the
definition of practice before the IRS has changed
over the years. The 1966 iteration provided: "Neither preparation of a tax return nor the appearance
of an individual as a witness for the taxpayer, nor
the furnishing of information at the request of the
[IRS] is considered practice before the Service."104
However the June 12, 2014, version states that
practice before the IRS:

comprehends all matters connected with a
presentation to the IRS relating to a taxpayer's
rights, privileges, or liabilities under laws or
regulations administered by the [IRS]. Such
presentations include, but are not limited to,

101

682 F.3d at 1317, n.1 ("We note that Brannen has not
challenged the amount or excessiveness of the user fee. lndeed,
Brannen expressly disclaimed any s uch argument in the district
court.").
102
Camp, supra note 6, at 457; see also Ariel Alvarez, "The
Constitutionality of the Inevitable Regulation of All Tax Return
Prefcarers," 14 / ..Accounting, Ethics & ('ub..Po/'¥ 7~5 (2013). .
03
See, e.g., Michael j. Desmond, "l he Continumg Evolution
of Circular 230: Proposed Regulations Repealing the 'Covered
Opinion' Standards, Imposing a General Competence Requirement and Expanding Existing Procedures to Ensure Compli·
ance," 15 /. Tax Prac. & Proc. 23 (Dec. 2013-Jan. 2014).
1 1
31 F.R. 10773, 10774 (Aug. 13, 1966).

°'
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preparing documents; filing documents; corresponding and communicating with the [IRS];
rendering written advice with respect to any
entity, transaction, plan or arrangement, or
other plan or arrangement having a potential
for tax avoidance or evasion; and representing
a client at conferences, hearings, and meetings.1os
Subpart B sets out 19 sections detailing duties
and restrictions regarding practice before the IRS.
The sections involve areas such as conduct when
dealing with the IRS, t06 fees charged to clients, 10 7
best practices and arrangements to foster them,10s
standards for tax returns and others documents, iO<J
competence, 110 and written advice. 111
Portions of subpart B take the same expansive
approach to practice before the IRS that section 10.2
does. Section 10.27 provides: "A practitioner may
not charge an unconscionable fee in connection
with any matter before the [IRS]." 112 It defines
matter before the IRS as including:
tax planning and advice, preparing or filing or
assisting in preparing or filing returns or
claims for refund or credit, and all matters
connected with a presentation to the
[IRS] ... relating to a taxpayer's rights, privileges, or liabilities under laws or regulations
administered by the [IRS]. Such presentations
include, but are not limited to, preparing and
filing documents, corresponding and communicating with the [IRS], rendering written advice with respect to any entity, transaction,
plan or arrangement, and representing a client
at conferences, hearings, and meetings. 113
Other parts of subpart B refer to "matter" before
the IRS or its equivalent without defining the term.
Presumably, in at least some of these parts, the
intent is to rely on the section 10.27 definition.11 4 ln

105

31 C.F.R. section 10.2(a)(4).
31 C.F.R. section 10.20 (information to be furnished to the
IRS), section 10.21 (advising the IRS of client's omissions),
section 10.22 (diligence on accuracy), and section I0.23 (prompt
dis~osition of pending matters).
07
31 C.F.R. section 10.27. Section 10.27(b) regarding contingent fees was at issue in Ridgely.
108
31 C.F.R. sections 10.33 and 10.36-10.38.
109
31 C.F.R. section 10.34.
110
31 C.F.R. St.>etion 10.35.
111
31 C.F.R. section 10.37.
112
31 C.F.R. section 10.27(a).
1
n31 C.F.R. section 10.27(c)(2).
114
E.g., 31 C.F.R. section 10.30(a)(l) (restrictions on advertising and solicitation) and section 10.30(d) (prohibiting a practitioner "in matters related to the" IRS from assisting, or
accepting assistance from, "any person or entity who, to the
knowledge of the practitioner, obtains clients or othe rwise
practices in a manner forbidden under this section").
1116
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other situations, however, matter before the LRS is
limited by context to a later phase in the process. us
Subpart C contains four sections addressing sanctions for violation of the regulations. Possible sanctions indude censure, sus pension, disbarment, and
monetary penalties. 116 Sanctions may be imposed
under any of these circumstances: "if the practitioner
is shown to be incompetent or disreputable (within
the meaning of section 10.51), 117 fails to comply with
any regulation in this part (under the prohibited
conduct standards of section 10.52), or with intent to
defraud, willfully and knowing ly misleads or threatens a client or prospective client." 11 8
" Part" means part 10 of title 31 of the Code of
Federal Reg ulations, in other words, the whole of
Circular 230. However, section 10.52 somewhat
mrngates this broad sweep. First, section 10.33 lays
out best practices for tax advisers. Because those
best practices are primarily aspirational, failing to
conform to them is not sanctionable. 119 Second,
violations of Circular 230 rules generally are sanctionable only if they are committed willfully. 120
However, recklessness or gross incompetence suffices whe n the rules violated are section 10.34
(standards regarding tax returns and documents),
section 10.35 (competence), section 10.36 (procedures to ensure compliance), or section 10.37 (requirements for written advice).121
Subpart D contains 23 sections setting out rules
applicable to disciplinary proceedings, and subpart
E has four general provisions.
B. Sting in the Recent Cases
Two aspects of Loving and Ridgely pose dangers
to aspects of Circular 230 beyond the particular
regulations at issue in, and invalidated by, those
decisions. They are (1) the threshold the cases offer
for tht! commencement of practice before the IRS,
and (2) the s pirit in whlch, or the level of rigor with
which, the court performs the Chevron s tep one
inquiry. These are described below.
1. Com mencement of practice before the IRS. Both
Ridgely and Loving held that the plaintiff's activities

were outside the permissible scope of regulation
because they preceded the point at whlch there was
a representative engaged in practice before the IRS.
But it is unclear precisely where the courts loca ted
that point. Within and between themselves, the
cases arc in tension.
Loving addressed the preparation and filing of
tax retums. The circuit court's opinion endorsed as
"succinct and cogently explained" the following
passage from the Loving district court opinion:
Filing a tax rehun would never, in normal
usage, be described as " presenting a case." At
the time of filing, the taxpayer has no dispute
with the IRS; there is no "case" to present. This
definition makes sense only in connection
with those who assist taxpayers in the examination and appeals stage of the process. 122
The circuit court added that "the statute contemplates re presentation in a contested proceeding" 123
and that practice before an agency or court "ordinarily refers to practice during an investigation,
adversarial hearing, or other adjudkative proceeding."124
Ridgely addressed the preparation and filing of
what it called ordinary refund claims - that is,
claims the taxpayer filed after she filed her retmn or
thal she filed during the course of an IRS audit, but
in either case filed before she commenced a refund
s uit. The court endorsed the plaintiff's position that
the taxpayer's adviser "would not be legally representing the taxpayer until the lRS responds to the
cfajm and the CPA submits a p ower of attomey." 125
ln other words, the adviser is not a representative
engaged in practice "before the commencement of
any adversarial proceedings with the lRS or any
formaJ legal representation by lhe CPA." 126
The Ridgely court returned to that theme later in
its opinion. After quoting the portions of Loving
discussed above, the Ridgely court likened the situation before it to that in Lovhw: "The process of

122

742 F.3d at 1018 (quoting <l17 F. Supp.2d at 74).
2-17-12 F.3d at 1020.

1
11
~for instance, S<.'Ction J0.20{a)(l) requires the practitioner to
"promptly submit records and information in any matter before" the IRS, absent a reastmable, g<xx.l-foith btdid that the
material i:; privileged. This duty operates once there has been "a
proper and lawful request by a duly a uthorized officer or
employee" of U1e IRS, which presupposes that an audit or other
IRS-taxpayer int('ractive process already has begun.
11
631 C.F.R. section 10.SO(a) and (c).
11 7
Section 10.51(a) identifies 18 categories of incompetence
and disreputable conduct, and this enu1neration is iUustrative,
not exhaustive.
11
831 C.F.R section 10.SO(a).
11
<>31 C.F.R. ~'lion 10.52(a)(l).

IW[tf.
12 1

31 C.F.R. st?cti1•n 10.52(a)(2).
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124

/d. at 1018.
U.S. Di~t. LEXIS 96447, at •4.
126 /d. (emphasis in the original). Thi::; formulatinn is s lightl y
rewurkcd in the order the Ridgely co url entered tm the same day
it handed down its opinion. TI1e order provided in part as
t

2"20l4

follnws:
ORDERED that (Treasu ry i111d the IRS] lack s tatutory
authority to promulgate· or enforce th..: restrictions on
contingent foe arrangements, as delineated in 31 C.F.R.
St,'<"tion 10.27, with respt,>c:t to the preparation and filin g of
Ordinary Refund Claims, whe re " preparation and flli.ng"
precedt.'S the inception ~)f any examination or adjudicati on of the refund claim by the IRS a"d any formal legal
reprei.entation on the part of the practitioner.
Ridgely, 20 14 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96447 (D.D.C. July 16, 2014).
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filing an Ordinary Refund Claim - again, before
any back-and-forth with the IRS - is similar to the
process of filing a tax return h1 that both take place
prior to any type of adversariaJ assessment of the
taxpayer's Uability."121
There are several discordancics in these Loving
and Ridgely formulations. A dlief one is that they
sometimes emphasize the element of conflict (the
IRS must have actuaJJy disagreed with the taxpayer
dbout the return or the claim), while at other times
th('Y emphasize a formaJ event or stage in the
process (such as commencement of an audit or
Appeals Office hearing, or the filing of a power of
attorney form with the IRS).
These divergent formulations could point to different moments for when the Rubicon has been
crossed. For instance, Ridgely identified the filing of
the power of attorney form as a possible crossover
point, but neither Loving opinion did so. Moreover,
an CRS audit certainly involves back-and-forth, but
it need not be contested or adversarial The IRS's
goal in examining a return is to determine true tax
liability, not to skin the taxpayer out of every dollar
possible. •2R Many audits are closed on a no-change
basis or even with the determination of an overpayment.
ln a detailed and insightful article, Camp has
argued that £RS aud its are best understood as
inquis itorial rather than advcrsarial. 129 Some Tax
Court judges took this theme even further, maintaining that we should "view a tax triaJ as being
investigatory in nature rather than a simple adversary proceeding." 130 Whether one goes that far
regarding tax trials, there is much to commend the
view that - at least from the JRS's standpoint the taxpayer should not at the audit stage be
perceived as an adversary.1:11
Other ambiguities exist as well. The Loving circuit
court referred to an "adjudicative proceeding'' but
did not define that concept. We often associate it
with cases tried in court or trial-type hearings
before administrative law judges, but the APA uses
the term more broadly. Under the APA, adjudka-

1272014

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96447, at •16.
1
2$£.g., Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689.
12
')Camp, "Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and
the PMli:il P11radigm Shift in the lnk•rnal Revenue Service
Rt•s trucluring and R~form Act of 1998," 56 fla. Tax Rev. 1, 17-78
(20<.~.

1
fheodore Tannenwald Jr., ''Tax Trials: A View Prom the
Bench," 59 ABA f. 295, 295 (1973); see also Meade Whitaker,
"Som,_, fhoughts on Current Practice," 7 Vtz. 1ax Rev. 421,
437-43R (198R), and Tannenwald, "The Ervin N. Griswold Lecture," 15 Am. f. Tax Pol'y l, 7-8 (1998).
''.\'See, 1•.g., Loving, 742 F.3d at 101R ("the IRS conducts it:.
own ... non-adversarial a~>SSment of the taxpayer's liability").
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tion is an "agency process for the formulation of an
order,''132. and an order is "the whole or a part of a
final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a
matter other than rule making but including licensing."•a'1 Tax lawyers are not accustomed to thinking
of the 1RS as an adjudicatory body, but withl_n this
framework of the APA, many kinds of IRS actions
and decisions constitute adjudications. 134 Did the
D.C. Circuit mean adjudicative proceeding to be
understood from an everyday perspective or an
APA perspective?
Even if the latter, we still are not out of the
woods. The above APA definition refers to a "final
disposition." Typically, finality requires two elements. First, the action must be the consummation
of the agency's deliberative process, not merely a
tentative view. Second, the action must determine
rights and obligations; legal consequences must
flow from it.13s The notion of finality shoves to later
in the process the point at which the [RS can
properly be said to have adjudicated. Issuance of a
statutory notice of deficiency (90-day letter) by the
IRS is a finaJ order in APA terms. Issuance of a
revenue agent's report (30-day letter} by the CRS is
not a final order. t36
Similar ambiguity exists in Ridgely. Ridgely's reference to "adversarial assessment" evokes the deficiency process under which the IRS often can.not
assess additional income, estate, or gift taxes without first issuing a notice of deficiency and a llowing
an opportunity for prepayment review of the merits
by the Tax Court.137 But the issuance of a notice of
deficiency comes after audit and often after JRS
Appeals Office considera tion. Did the court intend
to push the decisive moment so late in the process?
"Assessment" has an w1derstood term of art
meaning in tax parlance. 1Js Ccner<1list judges often
use the term imprecisely, but docs mere sloppiness
explain the Ridgely court's use of it? That explanation would be undercut by the fact that the Loving

ms
u.s.c. section 551(7).
1

l:l 5 U.S.C. section 551(6); see Alan 6. Morrison, "Administrati ve Agencies Are Just Like Legislatures and Courts - Except
When They're Not," 59 Adm/11. L. /{(!v. 79, 98 (2007) ("under llw
APA, any agency action that i~ not a rulemaking is an adjudi·
cation").
13
~See Johnson, "Reasoned Rxpbinati1)n and IRS Adjudication," 63 Duke L. /. 1771, 1792- IROO (2014).
1
J"E.g., Be11nett i>. Spe(lr, 520 U.S. 154, 177- 178 (1997).
1
:'16A 90-day letter is the offkial dett•rmination of the IRS. A
30-d~· letter is not. £.g., !'ection (>212(a).
1
"' See sections 6211 through 62 13.
1311
See st"Ctions 6201 through 6204; U11ited SI.ates v. Galletti, 541

U.S. 114, 122 (2004).
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district court began its analysis by defining assessment,139 as did the Ridgely court. 140 If that was not a
result of sloppiness, then was Ridgely intentionally
pushing until late in the process the commencement
of "practice before the IRS"?
In short, both Loving and Ridgely tell us, in their
respective contexts, that the Circular 230 provisions
there at issue misconstrued when practice before
the IRS starts. However, the cases do not leave us
with a settled understanding of the point, moment,
phase, or event that marks the commencement of
practice. Precision in this regard was not needed to
decide the particular questions in Loving and Ridgely. Future cases may well require greater clarity.
2. Rigor of Chevron step one analysis. Along with
the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit and its district
court are at the center of the great battles of administrative law. 141 Loving and Ridgely were decided as
they were because of, and reflecting shifts in, the
dominant judicial approach to Chevron in administrative law, especially in the D.C. Circuit.
It once was thought that Chevron was a "superdeferential approach," 142 and that may once have
been so. 143 But fashion, the prevalence of 3-D movies, and judicial styles of interpretation change over
time. Many cases would have been decided differently had they reached the courts at a different time,
when a different interpretational approach held
sway. As relevant here, in recent years, there has
been a tum in administrative law back toward
congressional primacy. Judicial deference to agencies has weakened as a result.144
A subtle but impor:tant shift has occurred in how
judges frame the question - a shift from "I'll
uphold the agency action unless Congress prohibited the agency from wielding this power" to "I'll
uphold the agency action only if Congress gave the
agency this power." As a practical matter, a judge
laboring under the former approach is predisposed
to hold for the agency. Less so is the judge operating
under the latter approach.

139

917 F. Supp.2d at 69-70.

1 0

~ 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS %447, at ..2.

141
See, e.g., Jim Rossi, "Does the Solicitor General Advantage
Thwart the Rule of Law in the Administrative State?" 28 Fla. St.
U. L. Rev. 459, 460-461 (2000).
142£.g., William D. Popkin, Materials on Legislation: Political
l.anr.iuage and the Political Process 611 (2009).
~ 3 But see Richard ). Pierce Jr., "What Do the Studies of
Judicial Review of Agency Action Mean?" 63 Admin. L. Rev. 77
(2011) (finding that federaJ courts uphold agency actions about
70 percent of the time, regardless of whether Chevron or alternative standards of review are applied).
144
See, e.g., Jack M. Beerman, "The Turn Toward Congress in
Administrative Law," 89 B.U. L. Rev. 727 (2009); Johnson, supra
note 5, at 113-114.
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Chevron spoke not just of explicit congressional
conferrals of power on agencies. It also ventured
that statutory gaps can constitute implicit delegations. L45 That formulation is favorable ground for
the agency. Implicit delegation, however, was deemphasized in later cases. 146 Those cases, including
recent Supreme Court tax decisions, continue to
define delegation as a key aspect of Chevron, and
their main focus is explicit, not implicit, delegation.147
A key case in the current delegation-oriented
approach to Chevron is the Supreme Court's 2013
decision in City of Arlington v. FCC. 14s The agency
prevailed in that case, with the majority holding
that Chevron applies to an agency's determination of
the scope of its jurisdiction. This might seem proagency. It is not. The majority, in an opinion written
by Justice Antonin Scalia, stressed that Chevron
review - in jurisdiction cases as in all cases - is to
be exacting, not indulgent. Near the beginning, the
majority opinion stated: "No matter how it is
framed, the question a court faces when confronted
with an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers is always, simply, whether the agency has
stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority"
(emphasis in the original).1 49
At the end of its opinion, the CihJ of ArlinRton
majority reemphasized: "The fox-in-the-henhouse
syndrome is to be avoided ... by taking seriously,
and applying rigorously, in all cases, statutory limits
on agencies' authority. Where Congress has established an ambiguous line, the agency can go no
further than the ambiguity will fairly allow. 111 so
None of the nine justices - whether in the majority,

115

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S.

199, 231 (1974).
116
£.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-227
(2001) ("We hold that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when
it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in
the exercise of that authority"); see Stephen M. Johnson, "Bringing Deference Back (But for How Long?)," 57 Cath. L. Rev. 1
(2007).
147
£.g., United States v. Home Concrete & Supply LLC, 132 S. Ct.
1836, 1843-1844 (2012); and Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713-714 (2011).
For discussion of Home Concrete, see Johnson, "Reflections on
Home Concrete: Writing Tax Regulations and Interpreting Tax
Statutes," 13 Fla. St. U. Bus. Rev. 77 (2014). For discussion of
Mayo, see Johnson, "Preserving Fairness in Tax Administrntion
in the Mayo Era," 32 Va. Tax Rev. 269 (2012); and Johnson, "Mayo
and the Future of Tax Regulations," Tax Notes, Mar. 28, 2011, p.
1547.
148
City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. 1863.
119
1d. at 1868.
150
/d. at 1874.

233

COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT

in concurrence, or in dissent - disputed the p roposition that Chevron step one review should be rigorous.
The Supreme Court handed down City of Arlington between the district court's and circuit court's
opinions in Loving. Despite preceding City of Arlington, the district court opinion applied a rigorous,
nondeferential style of analysis at Chevron step
one. 151 The Loving circuit court's opinion was unmistakably influenced by City of Arlington. The
opinion quoted City of Arlington in both the first and
last paragraphs of its analytical portion. 1s2 Unsurprisingly, early in its opinion, the Ridgely court also
quoted City of Arlington.15:1
The "construe the delegation rigorously" approach of City of Arlington continues to be the
dominant conception of Chevron. A June 2014 Supreme Court decision quoted CihJ of Arlington in
support of this proposition: "Even under Chevron ... agencies must operate within the bounds of
reasonable interpretation."154 And a September
2014 circuit court case remarked: "An administrative agency's authority is necessarily derived from
the statute it administers and may not be exercised
in a manner ... inconsistent with" what Congress
ordained. 155
Nonetheless, pendulums swing. The fact that
rigorous step one analysis is in vogue now guarantees nothing for the future. Chevron cases are litigated every day the courts are open. The equities of
these cases will always influence doctrine, as will
the ever-shifting perceived necessities of the time.
A significant current area of controversy involves
Chevron and tax aspects of the Affordable Care Act.
On July 22, 2014, panels of the D.C. Circuit and the
Fourth Circuit issued conflicting opinions in this
controversy. Sections 1311(b)(l) and 1321(c) of the
ACA encourage states to establish exchanges
through which individuals can buy medical insurance. Thirty-four states have chosen not to do so,
however. Accordingly, under section 1321(c)(l) of
the act, the Department of Health and Human
Services has set up federal exchanges in those
states.

Section 368, added to the tax code by the ACA,
authorizes a tax credit for persons buying insurance
through an exchange "established by the State
under section 1311." 156 Taken literally, this language
would not make the credit available to those who
buy insurance through the federal exchange established in the state in lieu of the state establishing its
own exchange. However, by regulation, Treasury
has interpreted section 36B broadly and made the
credit available as well to customers of those federal
"in lieu of" exchanges. 157 The validity of that regulation has been challenged.
In Halbig v. Burwell, over a dissent and reversing
the trial court, a panel of the D.C. Circuit concluded
that the statute unambiguously restricts the section
36B credit to insurance purchased on stateestablished exchanges and so invalidated the regulation at Chevron step one. 1ss On the same day, in
King v. Burwell, a panel of the Fourth Circuit,
unanimously and affirming the trial court, upheld
the same regulation under Chevrvn. 159
Since then, a district court has agreed with the
Ha.lbig decision;160 the D.C. Circuit, vacating the
panel decision, has granted en bane review of
Halbig; 161 and the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in King. 162 Even if the regulation at issue is
ultimately upheld, that would not undermine the
conclusion that Chevron step one inquiries are conducted in a rigorous manner. It is settled that the
step one analysis looks at the statutory language in
context, not in isolation. 163 The role of the section
36B credit in the total scheme of the ACA's operation provides significant (though not necessarily
decisive) contextual support for the interpretation
enshrined in the regulation. 164
Moreover, a pro-government result in the section
36B controversy would not necessarily have spillover utility to the government in Circular 230 cases.
The Supreme Court has cautioned against courts
placing too much weight in interpretation on apparent anomalies within statutes. 165 That principle
may excuse anomalies within the ACA, which
consists of 10 titles stretching to more than 900

1

~ction 36B(b)(2)(A).

157

Reg. section 1.36B-2(a)(1).
758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
159
759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014).
160
0klahoma v. Bunvell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139501 (E.D.
Okla. Sept. 30, 2014).
161
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17099 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014).
16
25. Ct. Dkt. No. 14-114 (cert. granted Nov. 7, 2014).
•('3£.g., Nat'l Ass'11 of f-lome Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551
U.S. 644, 666 (2007); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341
(1997).
164
See King, 759 F.3d at 374.
16
sE.g. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct.
2024, 2033-2034 (2014).
158

15

'Sec Johnson, supra note 5, at 113-120.
742 F.3d at 1016, 1022.
153
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96447, at *13.
154
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442
152

(2014). The Court particularly warned against deference that
"would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion
in [the agency's) regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization." Id. at 2444. That is just what the regulation
invalidated in Loving did.
15
~ Unitcrl States v. Transocean Deepwater Drilling Inc., 767 F.3d
485, 489 (5th Cir. 2014).
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pages. 1'"' Les'> intcrprctational mdulgcnc(• would be
appropriate for thr .,hort 31 U.S.C <;('Chon 330.
C. Potentially Vulnerable Circu lar 230 Provisjons

We have '>t't'n th,11 U.nimx ,md Ruixdy (1) reflect
the dominant i1pprottt h of rigorou.,, nondeforcntia1
review of .1gt.-ncy authority and .,t,1lutory clarity at
01ewon '>tep onr; (2) identify 11 U.S.C. !>fftion
330(a) as the foundation of frcasury's ability to
impose proft•.,.,1onal ~pon'>1bility rut~ Lhrough
Circular 230; (3) allow tho-.c rule... only to the extent
they bear on n.•prcscnt.1tivc-. engagl'<.i m practice
before the IRS, (4) limit "rcpre~ntativcs" to persons
who act as .1gcnts of taxpayNs in dealing with the
IRS and who possess lhC' lega l ,1ulh o rily lo act on
the behalf of their taxpayer~; .rntl (5) define practke
as commencing only at some nol yet precisely
marked lim<' or cv0n t invtllving (a) presentation to
the IRS o f "' powt'r o f .rnorncy, (b) the existen ce of
an actual db.pule bC'lwcen the tci xpayer and the IRS,
or (c} the? ...tart of .111 audit, a ~imi lM IRS action, or an
adjudicatory proccs.,.
Unles'> further litigation causes the courts to
retreat from lhl>se posilions, many portions of Circular 230, not 1ust those ~~>c 1fically at issue in
LouinK or R1dgcly, could be m pt•ril of invdlidation if
cha1lengl'CI. I will not attempt below to develop this
thought cxhau <>tively. lnste,1d, llw frx.·us will be on
some of tht• more import.mt portions that may be in
jeopardy
1. Section 10.22. &'(lion 10.22 of Circular 230 rethat cl pr,11. htionl'r t''NCI.'>(' due diligence
regarding accur,1cy in thre~ situations:

qui~

1. in pn:>p.uing or assisting

in

the pr<.'paration

of, approving, ;ind filing tax r<'lurns, documents, tlnd o ther papers relating to I IRSJ mattC?rs;
2. in drlt•rminlng thl' rom•ctnt•ss of oral or
writt<.'n rt•prt'scnlalions mctde by the practitioner to lhe Department of th(• Treasury; and
3. in d<'tNmining the com.>ctnc<>s of oral and
written rt'prt"•<'ntilllons made by lht? practitioner to clients with re-.pcc.t lo <lny matter admin1slcr1.'d by lht' [IRSJ 1 "~
This n.•gul,1llon 1., not fac1.1ll) invalid, but under
recent C<lSt''>, 11 may b<.' invalid ,,., ,1pplit-d m some
situations. If tht• rcfcrt•nccd ,1chvilil"> tc1kc place in
interaction-. w ith IRS pcrsonn<.'I ,1ftc.•r the c;tart of an
audit, lht•1r n.•gulahon undc.>r Circular 230 section
1022 likely would be uphl'ld under Ltrving and

1

'"'NrlR, 112 S ll "' 2580.

1r,;.ll

<.. I K

...1'<:t111n 10.22(a).
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Ridgely. I( tht>y occur eMlil'r than that, regulation,
and Lhc imposition of <.ancllon<> for violation, would
seem to be in peril.
2. Section 10.27. Section 10 27 ,1ddrc<>SCS fees that
practitionN"> charge their clit.>nts. fhis c;ccbo n 's limitation on contingent fcc.,•M was ill bsuc in, and was
partially invahdat<.'d by, Rulg1•/11. However, the section a lso rnntains a mort• gl•neral prohibition: "A
practitioner may not charge an unconscionable fee
in connection with any math.•r bt..•forc" the IRS. 1&9 As
seen m Part IV./\ above, Lht.> "<.'Clion defines a matter
before the IR5 bmadly. 1"'
The Ridgely plaintiff did not ask the court to
invalidat<.• th<.' g<.'ncral unconscionability provision,
and tht> c.1.;<.' d id n o t, .1 ... ,, form,11 mf!llPr, <lfff'ct it.
However, the logic of the case applies to the general
unconscionable fees rule as fully as it does to the
s pecific conlingc.•nl fees rule.
3. Section 10.29. Largely tracking general ethical
rules, 171 section 10.29 providl'~, with sta ted exceptions, that ''.l practitionrr shclll not represent a client
before tht' 11 RS I if the rt'pre:..cnt,1tion involves a
conflict of interest," which the -.eclion then defines. 172
The key to the va lidity of this provision in a
/.JJvi11,~ / R1d~t·l11 environment 1s, of rnurse, the scope
of "before the IRS." In that contC?xt, this rule would
be cnfom.•abk• o nly after the practitioner has become a "n•pre..cntative" and the process has matured into "practice" ,1s tho~ tcr~ are defined in
the caS<'s.
4. Section 10.34. 5'.>ction 10.34 ~ts out standards for
tax rc'lumc; and docum<.>nts, affidavits, and other
papers. It (I) prohibiL<> prnchtionc~ from advising
clien ts to tak(• unreasonable positions on returns or
refund clt1im!>, 111 and (2) rc.•quires practitioners to
apprise clients of potential p<.•m1ltics for returns and
oth e r documl•nls submitll'd to tlw IRS. 174 To the
exten t tlw~w C1nd other rules apply lo return preparation and other pre-audit aclvic<', they are at risk
under Loving ;ind l~idgcly.
5. Section 10.36. Section 10.36 l'stablishcs procedul"<.'s to C'nc:;ur<.' compli.mct• IL provides in part as
foll owe;:
Any individu.11 .,ubjt>et to !Circular 230) who
hac:;
principal authority and rt'Sponsibility
for ovcr...t'<.'ing tl firm''> pr.11.tict' governed by

11"'31 C

I R '>l'Clion I0.27(b).
~'Ct1t1n I0.27(a)
'\t."Cl1vn I0.27(c).
171Sr.· \ml•rican Bar J\'>'>OCl.lhllO ~loJd Kulc 1.7; and Dn't:lopmr111~ 111 tire L.a,,• - C'o1111ic '' 11( l11t.•r....1m l/rr l .fX"I Pmfession, 'J-1
H11ro. I Rc·v 12-14 ( l!JXl).
1721 I ( f R '>l'\:llon 10.29(.i), {b).
17 '11 (. I· R ~'Ct111n IO.'.W(J), (h).
171
3 l <.. hit '>l't'tmn 10.'.W(c).

""':11 C. I K
1
~1 <.. I R
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lhis part, including the provision of advice
concerning FedcraJ tax matte rs and preparation of tax returns, claims for refund, or other
documents for submission to the (IRS], must
take reasonable steps to ensure that the firm
has adequate procedures in effect for a U members, associates, and employees for purposes
of complying with [Circula r 230]. ln the absence of a person or persons identified by the
firm as having the principaJ a uthority a nd
responsibility described in this paragraph, the
IIRS] may identify one or more individuals . .. respons ible for compliance w ith the requirements.175
The IRS has no t often attempted to enforce
Ci rcuJar 230 section 10.36. Overseers are tutlikely to
be held sanctionable when the overseen themselves
arc not. lf the above observations about Circular 230
have force regarding the duties of line practitioners,
they also would seem to apply to Lhc duties of thei r
supervisors.
6. Section 10.37. Section 10.37 is poten tially a mong
U1€' more important of the sections not formaJJy a l
issue in recent cases but perhaps imperiled by them.
At Ll'le stages of its development, adoption, and
amendment, this section and its predecessors have
received more att.c ntion from tax practjtioners than
most other prt?scriptions and proscriptions in Circu la r 230. 1711
Treasury reworked the rules now in section 10.37
several times over the last three decades as part o f
the war against tax shelters. Key rules formerly
were lodged in section 10.35. They migrated into
section 10.37 via Circular 230 amendments proposed in 2012 and finalized in 2014. 177
Subject to various implementing rules, section
l 0.37 requires that a practitioner:
i. base the written advice on reason<1ble factual
and legal assumptions ...;
ii. reasonably consider all re leva nt facts and
circumstances that the practitioner knows or
reasonably should know;
iii. use reasonable efforts to idcntify and ascertain the facts rclC'va.nt to written advice on
each Federal lax matter;
iv. not rely upon representations, sta tements,
fincLings, o r agreements ... of the taxpayer or
any other person if reliance on them would be
unreasonable;

v. relate applicable law and authorities to facts;
and
vi. nol, in evaluating a Federa l tax matter, ta ke
into accOllnt the possibility lhat a tax return
will not be audited or that a matter w ill not be
raised on aud it. 178

The section defines a fodcrd l tax matter as "any
matter concerning the application or interpretation
of [inter alia any] law or reguJation administered
by" the [RS. 17<)
Clearly, this is directed a t written advice rendered before a return has been selected for a udit,
before the commencement of an adjudicatory process, and before the occu rronce of any other
taxpayer-I.RS or adviser-IRS interactions. [f the approach of Loving and Ridgely s tands, one foot of
section 10.37 is on the gallows and the other foot is
o n a banana peet.11;10
7. Some possible rejoinders. The Ridgely court
s tressed that apart from the cha llenge to the section
10.27(b) contingent fee ru les, " the parties have not
raised, ru1d the Court expresses no view o n, the
IRS's a uthori ty to issue and enforce standa rdf; of
practice by representatives under other subsections" of Circular 230.1s1 Thal observation may ring
differently lo different ears. To the government, it
might be a sweet invitation to develop better vehicles than section 330(a), which broke down in
Loving and Ridgely. To potential future plaintiffs, it
might be a sonorous tattoo of future troubles; they
may have to meet arguments s tronge r than section
330(a). From whichever perspective, it wouJd be
surprising indeed if the dcdded and pending cases
described in Section ID above were the last Clwz1ro11
challenges to aspects of Circular 230.
ln future cases, the 1RS may attempt to distinguish Loving a nd Ridgely, idcaUy lo cabin them to
their facts, by adverting Lo factual differences. The
government's effort along thal line fell flat in Ridgely. The government noted that L.ouing and Ridgely
involved different types o( plaintiffs - non-CPA
preparers in the former but a CPA in the latlt'r and different provisions of Circular 230 - sections
10.3 to 10.6 in t.he former but section 10.27 in the
lalter. 1112 Those were dis tinctions, to be sure, but
without meaningfuJ differencc. 1111

178

31 C.F.R. ::.cctiun 10.37(a)(2).

179

1

;-t;3 I C.F.R. section 10.36(a).
"See, e.g., T<>bin ct al., supra note 1, at 204 (noting that rut~
;mcestral to the curn:nt section 10.37 " have received a Int of
foclL'> from the tax bar, and there have lx.-en a lot of complainb
that !they gol too rar" ).
177
St•e Desmond, ,;1qm1 note 103, at 23-24.
17
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31 C.F.R. section 10.37(d).
1 1
8! See, t'.g., Madara, "Court Rclie:1 on Loving in Striking
Down ContinHcnt Ft-e Ruk.'S," Tax Nalt'S, July 21, 2014, p. 242
(describing the views of Stuart Bassin, counsel for the plnintiffs
in Steele, di:.cu::.sed in Section Ul.C.2).
181
Ritlgel.1f, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96+17, a t •12, n.3.
18
z/d. at 414.
163/d.

TAX NOTES, January 12, 2015

COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT

Alterna tively, the govC'mmcnt m.ight attempt to
cast a thread of connection over the divide identified by thl" rec<'nt cascs
the divide between what
is potentially controversial (thus constituting practice and Lhercby subjl"CI to rt>gula tion under 31
U.S.C. S<'Ctio n 330(a)) and whi'lt is merely preparatory (LhtLo; non- practicl" cmd not s ubject to regulation). The govemmml tried to do so in Ridgely,
justifying the challenged Circular 230 rules as
means to prevent the "c'<plo itlation of) the audit
sclcction proc<'ss" by ovcrreflching prcparers. •tw But
this was Palsgrnfian .'K"' Chaos theory teUs us that a
chain of "but for " connections may Link a butterfly
Aapping its wings in Braz il to a tornado in Texas. 186
Whatever dcgrcr of truth Lha l may possess in the
abstract, in the eyes or the law, the thread of
connection cit somC' point becomes so attenuated
that it snaps under ils ow n weight.'ll 7 As in Ridgely,
metaphysical possibilities do not trump statutory
text and context.
V. How the Tax System M ig ht Respond
Assume tht1t the train of litigation outcomes
continues to roll down Lhc tracks laid in Loving and
Ridgely and, thuc;, that th<.• portions of GrcuJar 230
identified t1bovc m S..'Ction IV.C as being at risk are
in fact invalidated. This is far from a certainty, but it
is a possibility. Should thal future dawn, what
would the cthkal dimension of federal tax practice
look like?

The answer to lht1t question depends on what, if
any, direct o r collateral corrections arc made. That
action could involve o nC' or more of the following:
(1) federal legislation to strcnglhcn 31 U.S.C. section
330(a); (2) non-l<'gislativt' fodt'rnl responses, such as
greater cmphMis on civ il or crimina l penalties, 31
U.S.C. section 330{d ), 3 I U.S.C. section 330(b), other
federa l s tatutes, or "voluntary" programs emphasizing incentives instl'ad of commands; or (3) nonfedera l responses, such as s tate regulation and
maJpracticc actions broug ht by aggrieved taxpayers.

1

~/41 at 'I.

Pa/sgrof ''· '""~ 1~t1111J R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)
(holdmg that ach. that ill'l' the "bul for" cau:.e of injUI) still are
not actionable in tort 1( tlw con n~>chon between the acl:l> and the
in1urie:. ~ too ind"'.'<.I t\r rcm1>h: in probabihtv).
•st•se.., '\II·, Robl>rt C. I lilbom, "Sea Gulb, Butterflies. and
Grasshopper;· A Brid 111-;tory or the 13uttl•rfly Effect in onlinear ~amics," 72 Am. I /)hl(S1r:; 425 (2004).
167
Sl't', l'.g., Sm1tlt i• Ci>11m11s:;11mcr, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939)
(rejectini; a but-for tt."il fur dctl•rminmg whether cost!, are
deductible as ordinary tllld llL"Ct.">:-My businei,s expenses). affd
per c11ri111111 I l:l P.2d 11.J (2c1 Cir 11)40).
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A. Fed e ral Legisla tion
Lo11i11g and Rtd~dy, and future cases that may
follow their lead, art> or w ill be s tatutory, not
constitutional, dl>cisioni>. Ac; such, they always can
be reversed legis lative ly. Congress can amend 31
U.S.C. section 330 anytime it w ishes to s hore up the
delegation of rulemaking power on which Circular
230 rests.
Some effort.:; are being mad<.' to do just that for
the issue in LmimK: reg ulation of return preparers.
Treas ury, th<' IRS, .rnd some others believe that
greater regula tio n o f preparers is critically important to the viability of the tax system and the
protection of American taxpayers. 11!/S They also believe tha t Lhc ultimntc solution to the problem is
legjs lation to provide the s tatutory basis fetmd
Jacking in Lovi11~.111•J
Bills have bc.>cn introdLJccd, and some hearings
have been held . Som<' bills take the direction one
would expect - lhat is, lhey would, if enacted,
expand Treasury's statutory a uthority to prescribe
professional respons ibility rules for practice before
the TRS. 1Q(l But those proposals saiJ into s tiff head
winds of political opposiljon, in no smaU part
because o f remarkably maladroit navigation by the
lRS in recent yc>ars. The> JRS's inappropriate processing of a pplications for tax exemption by
conservative-leaning groups, its inept handling of
resultant congressional inquiries, waste and irresponsibi lity in some> TRS training programs, and
isolated acts of partisanship a nd illegality by incliv idual IRS employees all ht1ve created a hostile
climate for the IRS on Capitol Hill. 1111 As a resuJt, the
lRS's budget is La king big hits, 1•12 and the appetite
for legis lation of any kind to he lp the IRS is smaU.
Add in the g ridlock now prevailing in Washington,
and even the IRS acknowlcdg(!S that it does not
expect Cong ress to act anytime soon on legislation
to reverse La11i11R nnd F~id}?ely. 1 " 3

iAAsee john!>On, s1111ra note 'i, at 'i20-'i24 (de.scribing argumenh> and cvidenc(• on both !>idl'l> of lhc policy debate).
H>'9 Mac1ara, ~lll'fQ note n (quolmg John Dalrymple, IRS
Deputy C,>mmi.,..,inm·r for &•rvtCl'!> and Enforcement); >cc't' 11/~
Katherine M. I Mlwringtun, " R<.~ulalton or Paid Tax-Reform
Preparers A forvgunl! (t,nclui.ion Regard!~ or the Result in
the l.Jn>m.i: c.i~," I Suffolk ti L Rfi• On/111r 105 (2013).
'""C.i:.• I I R. 4470, la\. Return Pn:parer Accountability Act of
2014; and H.R. 1570, T.1:1.p.iycr ProtL'Ctinn and Preparer Fraud
Prevention Act of 20 l'l.
1 1
" £.g., Joi.eph J lhomd1f..4!, "Stop Blaming the IRS for
Pn>blems It Didn't Creak," Tur Nolf<', Jul} 14, 2014, p. 115
(apprupn.:1tcl}' noting th1.· ..,hurtcominbrs or Congres!> in tal(
h.-gislatilln .1nd uwn.ight, but -..iy in~ that " the IRS deserv~ a
hard time frt,m Con~rL~.,. In n.--ccnt year.., iii. lii.t of failures and
tra~r1.-ssioni. b long and ""'r1ou'>.")
1
Lx., IRS Ovcr..1ghl lk'.ird. "/\nnual Re port to Congl"CS!>
2013," at 11 -23 (Mnr. 20 14).
19
'Madarn, ~1111ra null' 13 (citing lk•noit).
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Another bill might offer a way around that
obstacle but would raise concerns of its own. If
enacted, the Tax Refund Protection Act of 2014
would vest authority to regulate tax return prepare rs not in Treasury and the IRS, but in the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an
independent agency within the Federal Reserve
System. 194 StyHng the meas ure as a consumer protection matter rather than a tax administration
matter and ves ting authority outside the IRS migh t
facilita te passage.
But we s hould think long and hard before expediency drives us in this direction. The CFPB is less
expert in the area than Treasury and the IRS. It also
has vast responsibilities under the Dodd-Frank Act,
which created it, and might pay Jess attention to this
interloper than to matters within its core responsibilities. Moreover, the CFPB is itself controvers ial. lt
was designed lo have extraordinary independence
- far too much, critics allege. The CFPB's broad
empowerment and its relative independence from
congression<tl, presidential, and judicial overs ight
have led to suggt>slions that the CFPB is dangcrous, 1 9~ perhaps unconstitutional.1%

B. Possible Non-Legislative Federal Actions
1. Civil and crimina l penalties. Even if Circular 230
were invalidated in toto (wrud'\ no one s uggests is a
possibility), the government could s till punish (and
hopefully deter) egregious wrongdoing and incompetence by tax advisers and return preparers. An
imposing array of potentially appl icable civil and
criminal provis ions exists in the tax code.
CiviJJy, the code sets forth penalties (of varying
amounts, with different elements and s ubject to
various defenses) for advisers or preparers who (1)
give unreasonable advice, leading to a tax understatement, 1q7 (2) fail to give the taxpayer a copy of
the rcturn, 19ti (3) fail to sign the rcturn, 199 (4) fail to
s upply an identifying numbe r,200 (5) fail to retain
copies or a lis t of re turns,2°1 (6) endorse or negotiate
a check issued to a taxpayer,'~112 (7) fail to comply
with due diligen ce regulations concerning the

earned income tax credit, 20~ (8) promote abusive tax
s helters,204 (9) aid and abet the understatement of
tax liabilities,2ns and (10) improperly disclose tax
return information.2 06 Moreover, violation of some
of these provisions allows the government to seek
an injunction against the adviser or prepare r prohibiting future conduct, including return prcparation.207

CriminaUy; tax advisers and return preparers can
be incarcerated wider the tax code for (1) altcmpting to evade or defeat the assessment or colleclion
of a tax,208 (2) aiding and assisting in the understatement of tax Hability,209 (3) delivering to the IRS a
false return or olher documc nt,2 10 (4) interfering
with tax administration, 211 and (5) unauthorized
use or disclosure of tax return information.212 These
prohibitions are reinforced by criminal statutes in
other titles of the U.S. Code, including prohibitions
on lying lo federal officials,:u., conspiracy,2 14 a iding
and abetting violation of the law,m and mail and
wire fraud .21 "
The Lo11ing and Ridgely courts adverted to those
sections in giving Circular 230 a restricted scope.
They concluded that Congress could not have in·
tended 31 U.S.C. section 330(a) to be read so broadly
that it would render superfluous this imposing
array of targeted sanctions211 or allow the lRS to
circumvent procedural sa fegua rds written into
them by basing sanctions ins tead on Circular 230.21a
Should future litigation invalidate vulnerable
portions of C ircular 230, the I RS would still have the
above civil a nd criminal sanctions with which to
punish, and by which to dNer, fraudul.ent or incompetent behavior by tax advisers and preparers.
Many arrows would remain in the government's
quiver. One must acknowledge I.he practical rea lity
that Circular 230 remedies might in some instances

20

3section 6695(g).

» 1Section 67tX>.

~lion 6701.

ZOOSect:ion 6713.
7407 and 7408.
208
Section 7201 .
2
0!'Secti on 72l)()(2).
21
°Section 7207.
211
Section 7212.
:mSections 721~(a)(3) and 7216.
213
18 U.S.C. ~>ction HJ01.
214
18 U.S.C. !:>e<'.tion 371.
21
-;18 U.S.C. sectio ns 286 and 287.
2 16
18 U.S.C. sections 1341 and 1343. For discussion of lhl! tax
and related criminal statutes, see John A. Townsend et al., 111x
Crimes, chs. 2A, 213. and 3 (2008); and Scott A. Schumacher,
" Magnifying Detern:nce by ProM?<uting Professionals," 8') Intl.
207Sectiorn..

'')'H .R. 4463.
Todd :lywicki, "The Consumer Hnancial Protectiun
13un.>au: Savior or Menace?" 81 Geo. Wuslt. I.. Rl'V. 856(2013); and
13renden D. Soucy, "The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:
111c Solution or the Problem?" 4-0 Fle1. SI. U. L Rro. 691 (2013).
'%Eric Pean.on, " A Brief &say on the Con&titulionality of lhc
C(msumer Financial Protection Bureau," 47 CreiKllton L. Ri:v. 99
5
'" £.g.,

(2013)1'1 St..>etion 6694(a), lb).
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' :tsection 6695(a).
1',.,St>ction 6695(b).
:?Wsection 6695(c).
20 'Section 6695(d).
:imsection 6695(f).
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1..ouiTlg, 742 F.2d a t 1020; Ridgcl.11, 20 14 U.S. DbL LEXIS
96447, at •17-· 1s.
118Lot1i11g, 917 P. Supp.2d al 72-79.
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be faster or easier to apply than alternative targeted
remedies unde r the civiJ and criminal sections described above. There could be an efficiency loss. But
after all, Congress wrote procedural safeguards into
civil and criminal penalties for a reason. Procedural
protections should not be brushed aside lightly just
to make the lRS's job easier.2 1<.1
2. 31 U.S.C. section 330(d). Our focus thus far has
been on subsection (a) of 31 U.S.C. section 330. It
now is time to bring subsection (d) into the discussion. Congress added subsection (d) in 1984 as part
of the tax shelter wars. Subsection (d) provides:
"Nothing in this section or in any other provision of
law shall be construed to limit the authority
of ... the Treasury to impose standards applicable
to the rendering of written advice with respect to
any entity, transaction plan or arrangement, or
other plan or a.rrangement, which is of a type which
rTreasury] determines as having a potential for tax
avoidance or evasion."
If courts continue to limit 31 U.S.C. section
330(a), the IRS wouJd be strongly tempted to
ground CircuJar 230 rules, as much as possible, in
31 U.S.C. section 330(d) as an alternative delegation
of rulcmaking power. Doing so would ra:ise three
concerns, however.
First, 31 U.S.C. section 330(d) isn't a dcm, affirmative conferral of power. It does not say that
Treasury has lhe power. It says only that no law
prevents it from having the power. But where is the
positive delegation from Congress to the agency? I
suspect the courts wouJd get past this objection,
though. The oddly worded section probably wouJd
be seen as a delegation by negative inference.220
Otherwise, what is the provision for? The courts
presume that Congress means its enactments to
have effect, and interpretations that create sta tutory
nullities usually are avoided.221

21
~Statutory procedural protections are not the only barrier
to effective enforcement; bureaucratic failure. play a role as
well A rcct.'nt study found that the IRS often (almost half the
time) fails to timely process complaints it receives about return
preparers. ·1roasury lnspector General for Tax Administration,
"Proc~ Do Not Ensure That Complaintl> Against Tax Return
Prepart!rS Are '!imely, Accurately, and Consistently Processed,''
No. 2014-40--056 (Aug. 8, 2014).
220
Probably but not certainly. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of
lite United 8t11tes ti. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 160 (4th C ir. 2013) ("we
do not presume a delegation of power [to ru1 agency) simply
from the absence of an express withholding of power"); and

National Rifle Ass'n of America Jue. v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122, 136 (D.C.
Cir. 2000). Cf Wowiak v. Dolgencorp LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
113437, at •7 (M.O. Fla. 2009) (a plaintiff "may not establish
federal {court! jurisdiction through negative inferenCL>S").

Second, 31 U.S.C. section 330(d) cou ld not support all of the vulnerable Circular 230 ruJes. By its
terms, 31 U.S.C. section 330(d) allows regulation of
wdtten advice onJy. Oral adv.ice or other conduct
would not be covered.
Third, some courts would feel w1easy about
aggressive application of 31 U.S.C. section 330(d).
The language having to do with "any plan or
arrangement Treasury thinks has a potential for tax
avoidance" is vague and potentially sweeping. Obviously, Congress was trying to get at tax shelters,
but neither thjs nor other statutes have been notably
successful in defining them.222
Tax avoidance usually is w1derstood as reducing
one's tax liability by legal means. Buying a house
rather than renting, buying tax-exempt state or local
bonds, and forming a business as a Jlmited liability
comp<rny or S corporation rather than a C corporation aU are transactions with potential for tax avoidance. Could Congress really have meant 31 U.S.C.
section 330(d) to sweep so broadly?
Hesitation regarding that question would inspire
some courts to disfavor an aggressive Treasury
interpretation of 31 U.S.C. section 330(d). l.ndeed,
that happened in Ridgely. The government asserted
31 U.S.C. section 330(d) late, raising it for the first
time in oral argument, and the court was disinclined to read the provision broadly. Finding that
the text, context, and history of 31 U.S.C. section 330
paint a clear picture, the court remarked: "That
clarity cannot be edipsed by brief, thinly supported
references to ambiguow,; statutory language [in 31
U.S.C. section 330(d)J, the relevance of which the
IRS never really explains. "22.'I
Continued restrictive interpretation of 31 U.S.C.
section 330(a) would give the government an incentive to do a better job of explanation in future cases.
For the reasons discussed above, 31 U.S.C. section
330(d) couJd not completely substitute for a broad
view of 31 U.S.C. section 330(a), but it would be part
of the package of government responses.
3. 31 U.S.C. section 330(b ). Could the government
in future cases make more s ubstantial use of another portion of the statute: subsection (b)? In
relevant part, 31 U.S.C. section 330(b) provides that
the IRS "may suspend or disbar from practice ... or
censure, a representative who ... is incompetent; ... is disreputable; ... violates regulations pre~
scribed under Lsection 33U]; or ... with intent to
defraud, willfully and k.nowir1gly misleads or
threatens the person being represented."
We will need a great deal more judicial guidance
before we can fmm a clear idea of the extent to

:m £.g., B11bbitl v. Sweet Home Chapter of Com1111111ities for a Great

Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 697-698 (1995); and Johnson, "The 'No
Surplusage· Canon in State ;md Local Tax
Note:;, ~pt. 17, 2012, p. 793.
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2014 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1..16447, at "22.

2 1
2. Ridgely,

239

COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT

which subsection (b) can occupy ground from
which Loving and Ridgely ousted subsection (a). One
question, of course, is whether practice and representative have the same meaning in the two s ubsections, rendering (b) as limited as (a). The
consistent meaning canon of construction would, if
applied, push a court toward the same meaning in
both places. 224 However, that canon is ignored or
decuned about as often as it is applied.225
Moreover, the component "violates regulations
prescribed under [section 330]" presumably does
not give Treasury carte blanche to promulgate any
regulations it wishes and thus bootstrap itself into
an opportunity, previously unavailable, to sanction
practitioners. Violation of a regulation that is procedurally or substantially invalid should not reasonably provide the predicate for imposition of
Circular 230 sanctions.226
4. 'Voluntary' initiatives. As seen in Section IIT.C.l,
as a stopgap pending legislative change, the IRS
created an ostensibly voluntary program to achieve
as fully as possible what the mandatory program
invalidated in Loving would have done. The ''voluntary" program survived its first chaUenge when
the district court decided AICPA. Will it avoid or
survive other challenges as well? If so, one would
expect the government to consider similar more or
less voltmtary expedients, whenever possible,
should other parts of Circular 230 be invalidated.
C. Possible Nonfederal Responses
1. State regulation. Extensive bodies of law already
exist in the states on the professional responsibilities of lawyers, CPAs, and some other professionals.227 No one thinks that state regulation and
professional self-policing are complete answers to
the problems, but some states may prove more
aggressive in regulation than others. For example,
four states regulate return preparers in ways that
would take up some of the slack created by Lov-

ing.22s

224
See, e.g., Atlantic Cleaners {:t Dryers Inc. v. United Stales, 286
U.S. 427, 433 (1932).
2
z.~see generally Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading
Lnw: Tile Interpretation of Legal Texts 170-173 (2012).
226
For discussion of the ways in whid1 Treasury tax regulations may be challenged, see Johnson, "Preserving Fairness in
Tax Administration in the Mayo Era," 32 Va. Tax /Zev. 269, 300-323

(2012)-

The state rules often are heavily influenced by ethical
pronmuicements by professional organizations. See, e.g., ABA
Formal Op. 85-352 Uuly 7, 1985); and "Report of the Special Task
Force on Formal Opinion 85-352," 39 Tax Law. 635 (1985).
228
Set Cal. Code Ann. section 22250; Md. Code Ann. section
10-824; N.Y. CLS Tax section 32; and Or. Rev. Stat. section
2,2

673.457.
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2. Malpractice s uits. Taxpayers given bad advice or
otherwise abused by their tax advisers and preparers often can sue in state or federal court on a
variety of theories. Again, this cannot be a complete
remedy. Many taxpayer-clients lack the resources to
successfully prosecute malpractice suits, and a
tangle of legal doctrines often renders those suits
unsuccessful.229 Nonetheless, this private remedy is
part of the mix. Malpractice suits are now fairly
common in failed high-end tax shelters and have
had at least some impact in curbing bad practices.23°

VI. Conclusion
We may be at the start of a sea change in
professional responsibility in tax. For decades, Treasury has been increasingly aggressive in regulating
tax practice through Circular 230. Recent cases
suggest that Treasury's zeal sometimes outstrips its
statutory authority.
If the approach of recent cases is confirmed by
future litigation and Congress chooses not to act,
significant portions of Circular 230 may be at risk of
invalidation.231 The fine art of rendering sound tax
advice - always difficult232 - may for a time
become even harder as once-accepted norms become unsettled.
The sky, of course, is not falling and will not fall.
Organisms and systems often display impressive
capacity to adapt to changed conditions. Moreover,
there are features of our federal tax system that
even with the loss of important parts of Circular 230
would prevent the degeneration of tax practice into
an anything goes Wild West free-for-all. We will
survive in any case, but the ways in which tax law
is practiced in the United States may have to find a
new equilibrium.
·

22
9n1cre is another possible concern. For many causes of
malpractice action, the plaintiff must identify a standard of care
or duty and then show that the adviser's conduct fe ll below that
standard. The Circular 230 rules ace a convenient source for
those standards. If important Circular 230 rules are invalidated
by the courts, plaintiffs in malpractice cases may find it more
difficult to establish that their advisers' conduct fell below a
reco~ized level of care or duty.
2
See, e.g., Jay A. Soled, "Tax Shelter Malpractice Cases and
Their Implications for Tax Compliance," 58 A111. U. L. Rev. 267,

268-269 (2008).
23 1
1am not alone in harboring this suspicion. "The outcomes

of Loving and Ridgely will spawn additional cases challenging
other sections of Treasury Circular 230 and possibly, or perhaps
probably, limiting some of the ethical rules of practice applicable
to even attorneys, CPAs, and enroJJ.ed agents." Internal Revenue
Service Advisory Council, 2014 Pub. Rep. 23 (Nov. 19, 2014).
:z.12 See, e.g., Charles A. Rose, "The Tax Lawyer's Dilemma:
Recent Developments Heighten Tax Lawyer Rt.>sponsibilities
and Liabilities," 2011 Co//1111. Bus. L. Rev. 258, 259.
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